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Executive Summary 
 
It is difficult to know whether widening access to schools which provide a more 
academically-orientated, general education makes a difference to average educational 
achievement. Although, there has been a shift in this direction in many OECD countries, 
reforms have been difficult to evaluate because they are often accompanied by other 
important changes to the educational system or because they have been introduced at the same 
time across regions. However, the consequences of such reform are deeply controversial and 
very much a current policy issue. In particular, contenders argue that an increase in access to 
the ‘academic’ track harms the quality of education for everyone (through contextual effects) 
without improving the prospects of those enabled to attend the more academic track.  
 
In this paper, we make use of a unique natural experiment to identify the net effect of 
widening access to schools which provide a more academically-orientated, general education 
on overall education outcomes. The reform consists of widening access to the more academic 
track within one specific province (Northern Ireland) at a particular point in time. This is the 
only differential change that happens across the regions considered – England and Northern 
Ireland – which otherwise have a similar curriculum with the same national examination for 
students at age 16 and 18. The reform enabled a very significant increase in the number of 
Northern Irish pupils who could attend the more academic track (‘grammar schools’) at the 
end of primary school, between the pre-reform (born in 1978) and post-reform cohort (1979). 
This natural experiment makes it possible to identify the effect of widening access to the more 
academic track on overall educational attainment, by comparing educational outcomes in 
Northern Ireland and England, before and after the reform.  
 
Using a ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis performed on administrative data, it can be seen 
that the ‘open enrolment’ reform of 1989 (affecting the 1979 birth cohort) has been 
accompanied by a clear impact in Northern Ireland relative to England. A 15 percentage point 
increase in the number of people enabled to attend grammar school (at age 11) was 
accompanied by shifts of a similar magnitude in the number achieving 5 or more GCSEs at 
A*-C and 1 or more A-level. This suggests a strong causal effect of expanding the more 
academic track on overall educational achievement. 
 
Just before the ‘open enrolment’ reform, there was a change affecting admissions in a 
qualitative way. Up to 1988, girls and boys were assessed in different categories such that the  
same percentage of entrants to the admission test would obtain a given grade (determining 
whether or not they could be admitted to grammar school). Following a high court ruling in 
June 1988, this practice was discontinued and from then on, girls and boys were assessed 
together (which affected grammar school intakes in 1989, i.e. the 1978 cohort). This change 
was to the advantage of girls since they outperformed boys on the ‘verbal reasoning’ tests that 
were the basis of selection at this time. The one year gap between this qualitative change to 
admissions and the ‘open enrolment’ reform has generated significant upward and downward 
shifts in the relative proportion of girls enabled to attend grammar school across cohorts 
1977-1980. We show that these shifts have been followed by parallel shifts in girls’ 
subsequent relative outcomes at age 16 and 18. This confirms the considerable effect of 
grammar school entry on educational outcomes using a different source of identification to 
that described when comparing outcomes over time between England and Northern Ireland. 
We also replicate this latter analysis for boys and girls separately and affirm our previous 
results. Thus, whether we compare girls and boys within Northern Ireland or make 
comparisons by gender between Northern Ireland and England, it is clear that grammar school 
reforms have a strong impact on educational outcomes and that the design of the educational 
system (in this case, the mechanism of entry into grammar school) has consequences for 
gender differences in educational outcomes. 
 
As well as considering the overall effect of expanding the academic track on educational 
outcomes, we are able to use the same experiment to consider whether the selective system is 
a contributory factor to observed inequalities between socio-economic groups with regard to 
later educational outcomes. Specifically, we are able to analyse the effect of the reform 
according to whether children are eligible for free school meals (FSM), which roughly 
corresponds to families at the bottom quartile of income. Before and after the reform, there is 
a big difference between the probability of lower-income groups entering grammar school and 
achieving good educational outcomes at age 16 and 18. The reform has an equal impact on 
children with and without FSM in terms of entry to grammar school and educational 
achievement at age 16 and 18. Hence, we are able to conclude that grammar school 
attendance has no less effect on relatively disadvantaged pupils than it has on more 
advantaged pupils. Therefore, the barriers that make it difficult for FSM children to enter into 
grammar schools in the first place (e.g. lower test scores at age 11 because of lower parental 
resources) has a long-term effect on inequality through (in part) to the lower probability of 
FSM children entering into grammar school.  
  
Although this paper cannot be interpreted as evaluating the overall effects of a comprehensive 
or selective/ ‘tracked’ system of education, it is an example of where widening access to the 
more ‘academic track’ has generated positive net effects. . It illustrates the high price 
individuals pay from being excluded from the ‘academic’ track, even when they are someway 
down the ability distribution within the cohort. Also, this study provides clear quasi-
experimental evidence that selection into the more academic track really has a causal impact – 
it is not simply an artefact of the selection process.  
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In the post-war period, there has been a gradual shift in many OECD countries towards more 
comprehensive school systems where an increasing proportion of students are given the 
opportunity to pursue education in more academically oriented schools (Meyer et al. 1977).  
The consequences of these reforms (both in terms of efficiency and equity) are still hotly 
disputed. As discussed by Meghir and Palme (2005), it is very difficult to disentangle their 
effect from the effects of other macro-economic or institutional changes because often they 
have been implemented nationwide simultaneously and in conjunction with other important 
educational reforms. 
 
Reforms involving an increase in access to an ‘academic track’ provoke opposing views 
because it is not clear whether or not all pupils benefit from academically oriented, general 
education. For example, those of lower ability may be better suited to education with a more 
vocational orientation. The pace and content of teaching may become more difficult to tailor 
to level of each ability group as the heterogeneity of pupils admitted to the academic track 
increases. Contenders argue that reforms involving an increase in access to the ‘academic’ 
track harm the quality of both tracks (through contextual effects) without improving the 
prospects of those enabled to attend the more academic track. Despite very rich data and 
many studies, there is still little convincing evidence on these issues (see Manning and 
Pischke, 2006, Figlio and Page, 2002). In particular, it has not yet been possible to identify 
the net effect of widening access to schools which provide a more academically oriented, 
general education on overall educational outcomes. This is the substantive question that this 
paper helps to address.  
 
We make use of a unique natural experiment where widening access to the more academic 
track applies within one specific province (Northern Ireland) at a particular point in time. This 
is the only differential change that happens across the regions considered – England and 
Northern Ireland – which otherwise have a similar curriculum with the same national 
examination for students at age 16 and 18. Unlike other studies, the reform modifies the 
proportion of students allowed to pursue a more academically-orientated education in the 
treatment area rather than change the entire educational system. Specifically, the reform 
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enabled a very significant increase in the number of Northern Irish pupils who could attend 
the more academic track (‘grammar schools’) at the end of primary school, between the pre-
reform (born in 1978) and post-reform cohort (1979). This natural experiment makes it 
possible to identify the effect of widening access to the more academic track on overall 
educational attainment, by comparing educational outcomes in Northern Ireland and England, 
before and after the reform.  
 
We use administrative data to examine the impact of this reform on entry flows to grammar 
school and the outcomes of affected cohorts. There is a clear discontinuity in the inflows to 
grammar school around the time of this reform – the number of students entering grammar 
school increased by about 15 percentage points between the 1978 and 1979 birth cohorts 
whereas it was reasonably stable for the four preceding and four subsequent cohorts. 
Interestingly, this discontinuity is reflected in outcome measures. For example, the number of 
students achieving high-school graduation (i.e. in the English context, obtaining at least 1 A-
level) increased by about 12 percentage points over the same period whereas it followed the 
same stable trend as the number attending grammar school in the four preceding and 
subsequent cohorts.
2  The increase is also reflected in the national examination taken by all 
pupils at age 16 (prior to the end of compulsory schooling).
3 Using a ‘difference-in-
difference’ analysis, it can be seen that this ‘open enrolment’ reform has been accompanied 
by a clear impact in Northern Ireland relative to England. This suggests a strong causal effect 
of expanding the more academic track on overall educational attainment.  
 
Just before the ‘open enrolment’ reform, there was a change affecting admissions in a 
qualitative way.  Up to 1988, girls and boys were assessed in different categories such that the 
same percentage of entrants to the admission test would obtain a given grade (determining 
whether or not they could be admitted to grammar school). Following a high court ruling in 
June 1988, this practice was discontinued and from then on, girls and boys were assessed 
together (which affected grammar school intakes in 1989, i.e. the 1978 cohort). This change 
was to the advantage of girls since they outperformed boys on the ‘verbal reasoning’ tests that 
were the basis of selection at this time. The comparison of cohorts born after and before 1978 
by gender confirms that the increase in grammar school attendance was stronger for girls than 
                                                 
2 As discussed below, A-levels are a very important qualification in a UK context. For example, they are an 
essential requirement for entry to university. 
3 GCSE examinations (General Certificate of Secondary Education) 
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for boys. Also we find a stronger effect of the reforms on girls’ subsequent educational 
attainment than on boys’. The increase in the relative proportion of girls attending the more 
academic track has been followed by an increase in their relative educational achievement.  
Thus, our paper provides evidence that the specific design of an educational system influences 




Our data also allow us to compare the effects of the reform on pupils coming from a poor 
family background (i.e. as defined by eligibility to receive free school meals – about 25% of a 
given cohort) and on pupils coming from a more advantaged background (i.e. not eligible to 
receive free school meals). As in most countries, pupils from a poor family background have 
lower cognitive outcomes at age 10 or 11 and are thus less likely to be selected for the 
academic track than pupils from other backgrounds. A very controversial issue is whether 
being denied access to the academic track has a causal impact on their relatively poor 
educational achievement. The reform enables us to address this question. We see that it had 
an equally large (positive) impact on pupils from a disadvantaged and more advantaged 
background. Furthermore, it produced gains of a similar magnitude in terms of educational 
performance. This finding suggests that any restriction on relative access to the academic 
track for poor students actually diminishes their relative educational achievement.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, we describe the institutional context. We briefly describe relevant 
aspects of the education system in Northern Ireland and in England, before discussing the 
reforms of interest in more detail. In Section 4, we discuss a conceptual model for considering 
the impact of these reforms. We then describe available data. We provide estimates of the 
effect of attending grammar school on educational qualifications using administrative data. 






                                                 
4 Pekkarinen (2005) and Machin and McNally (2005) also provide evidence on this point. 
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2 Existing  Literature 
 
 
There are several strands of the UK and international literature on ‘tracking’ which are of 
relevance to our study. In a UK context, of most relevance are studies that compare the 
outcomes of students living in areas with a selective educational system to those of students 
who live in areas with a comprehensive system. Within Great Britain, regional variation in the 
exposure to a ‘selective system’ existed at a time when the system was being transformed (in 
the 1960s and 1970s) because the transition to a comprehensive system only occurred 
gradually. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) and Kerkhoff et al. (1996) use this variation to 
estimate the effect of exposure to a selective or tracked system on educational outcomes 
(regardless of the school type actually attended by an individual). Atkinson et al. (2004) use 
more recent administrative data to perform a similar analysis in a contemporary setting (the 
‘selective school’ system was retained in a small number of areas in Great Britain). Manning 
and Pischke (2006) use the same data as that used by Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) and 
Kerkhoff et al. (1996). They argue that the measure of exposure to a tracked or selective 
system is unclear. Furthermore, the abolition of the grammar school system was not random 
across areas. Comprehensive areas were systematically poorer and had students with lower 
prior achievement than selective areas. Manning and Pischke suggest that such studies are 
unlikely to eliminate selection bias. They find that strategies relying on local variation in the 
degree of selectivity of the school system produce the same results regardless of whether the 
dependent variable is after the ‘treatment’ (i.e. age 16 test scores) or before the ‘treatment’ 
(age 11 scores) and conclude that caution is required in drawing strong conclusions from this 
data set and in any study that uses a research design which essentially mirrors that adopted by 
such studies. The same critique is applied to studies that attempt to estimate the effect of 




The difficult of dealing with selection bias also applies to studies that attempt to evaluate the 
impact of ‘within school’ tracking. Figlio and Page (2002) discuss problems in this literature 
                                                 
5 Examples of this approach include Dearden et al. (2002) and Harmon and Walker (2000). In the same spirit, 
Gallagher and Smith (2000) undertake a value added analysis of grammar schools in Northern Ireland for pupils 
in a small sample of schools after taking account of the transfer grade obtained in the selection test.  
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and attempt to circumvent the selection issue by using variation in tracking between schools 
(rather than within schools) to identify the effect of tracking. 
 
Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) have tried to get away from the difficult selection problems 
that arise when trying to evaluate the effects of ‘tracking’ within particular countries. They 
use international data sets that are administered to students in secondary school and primary 
school. They identify the effect of tracking by comparing performance differences between 
primary and secondary schools across tracked and non-tracked systems, where each country’s 
own primary school outcome is used as a control for its secondary-school outcome. They find 
mixed evidence about possible efficiency gains from tracking. However, these findings have 
been challenged by Waldinger (2006) who shows that results are not stable to using different 
tracking measures and to restricting the sample to OECD countries.
6  
 
Our study is different from all of the studies discussed above because we compare two 
regions before and after a reform that only affects one region. This approach has an advantage 
over the cross-country approach because we do not have to make comparisons across 
countries with very different institutions.  
 
In these respects, our study is more similar to Meghir and Palme (2005). They study the 
impact of a series of reforms that took place in the 1950s in Sweden but that were not 
implemented at exactly the same time across the country. However, there were several 
components to this reform, including de-tracking and an increase in the compulsory school-
leaving age. Hence, outcomes cannot be attributed to the specific effect of de-tracking.
7 The 
attractiveness of the ‘Northern Ireland’ experiment is that the ‘de-tracking’ reform is the only 
differential change that occurred in the treatment region relative to the control region during 
the time period of interest. Another distinguishing feature of our study is that the ‘natural 
experiment’ has not modified the nature of the school system but only modified the intensity 
of selection. To identify the effect of widening access to the academic track on average 
outcomes, we mainly rely on comparisons between children who go to school in the same 
educational system (i.e. a selective system), where reforms are made to that system rather than 
                                                 
6 The focus of Waldinger’s (2006) paper is different (though related) to that in Hanushek and Wößmann (2006). 
He is interested in whether the importance of family background is weaker or stronger in countries that differ in 
the extent to which they track pupils at an early age. 
7 Oreopoulos (2006) uses quasi-experimental evidence to show that the benefits of additional years of 
compulsory schooling are very large whether or not these laws have an impact on a majority or minority of those 
exposed. His findings are based on estimates in the UK, the US and Canada. 
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involving conversion to a different type of system. Our analysis can therefore be interpreted 
as showing the overall effect of allowing entry to an elite institution (or the ‘academic track’) 
for a group that was previously only at the margin of being admitted. 
 
Another dimension of our analysis is that we look at the effect of a qualitative change to 
admissions on the probability of entry to the academic track for boys and girls, and the effect 
this has on subsequent outcomes. This part of our analysis has similarities to Pekkarinen 
(2005), who also uses quasi-experimental evidence to evaluate the effect of a reform to the 
educational system on the relative outcomes of boys and girls. In his case, the experiment is a 
postponement in the age of tracking (from 10/11 to 15/16) at the time of the Finnish 
comprehensive school reform. He shows that girls benefited differentially from this reform 
and interprets this as arising on account of the timing of puberty (which works to the benefit 
of girls). Our results are consistent with the broader implication – that features of the 
education system matter greatly for the relative outcomes of boys and girls. 
 
 
3  The Institutional Context 
 
 
The education system  
 
In a number of key respects, the education system in Northern Ireland is almost the same as 
that in England and Wales. They operate under a similar legislative framework
8; they have a 
similar National Curriculum; and they have the same system of public examinations.
9 
However, in Northern Ireland, there is a selective system of education whereas England and 
Wales largely converted to the comprehensive model in the 1960s and 1970s.
10 This change 
                                                 
8 Important Acts are the 1944 Education Act for England and Wales and the 1947 Act for Northern Ireland; the 
1988 Education Reform Act in England and Wales and the Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 1989. 
9 There are 6 examining groups in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Comparability studies of the grading of 
papers by different examining groups are produced regularly (for particular subjects at GCSE and at A-level). 
We thank Angus Alton from the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority for providing us with these 
comparability studies dating from the early-mid 1990s for certain subjects. Although reports do occasionally 
highlight discrepancies between boards for specific grade boundaries (in a given subject), the overall impression 
is that boards are broadly consistent in their practices.  
10 Other important differences are religious segregation in the education system of Northern Ireland: most 
Catholics attend schools under Catholic management (‘maintained’) whereas most Protestants attend other state 
schools. Also, there are many more single sex schools in Northern Ireland – 25% compared to 16% in England. 
Of single sex schools, about 45% are grammar schools (i.e. those that select the more academically able). 
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almost happened in Northern Ireland as well but plans were halted following the election of 
the Conservative government in 1979. Unlike the comprehensive system (where schools are 
not allowed to select on the basis of academic ability), the selective system involves a test at 
age 11 which determines the type of secondary school a child will attend: grammar schools 
(for the more academically able) or other secondary schools.
11 The key difference between 
grammar and other secondary schools is in their pupil composition in terms of ability – along 
with the consequences this has for the teaching environment and the ethos of the school. 
Gallagher and Smith (2000) suggest that the ‘grammar school effect’ is explained by a 
combination of the clear academic mission of schools, high expectations for academic success 
on the part of teachers and the learning environment created by a pupil peer group which is 
selected on academic grounds.
12 All of these factors combine to make the education 
experience very different in grammar schools than in other secondary schools, even though 
they operate under the same National Curriculum and implement the same public 
examinations (discussed below). However, as argued above, it is difficult to separate out the 
influence of pupil composition and any ‘grammar school effect’, even in value-added studies. 
 
Between 1981 and 1994 (i.e. cohorts born in 1970 and 1983), the transfer test was based on 
two tests of the verbal reasoning type with some questions designed to test specific aspects of 
English and mathematics (Sutherland, 1993).
13 The tests are ‘norm-referenced’: they identify 
a pre-determined percentage of the cohort who are considered to be the most suitable pupils to 
fill the available grammar school places. Up to the time of the reforms (discussed below) 
about 31% of a cohort entered grammar schools, whereas this increased to about 35% of a 
cohort following the reform enabling an expansion of admissions (‘open enrolment’). 
 
All schools are expected to apply the National Curriculum. As discussed by Morgan (1993), 
this was an important change to education as the National Curriculum prescribes in detail the 
range of subjects pupils at all levels in compulsory education must study; the relative 
allocation of time to different areas of the curriculum; and the actual content of the courses in 
individual subjects. While grammar schools and other secondary schools operate under this 
                                                 
11 Up to 1990, a small number of fee-paying places were available in some grammar schools. This has been 
prohibited since 1990, except in the case of boarders. 
12 There is no suggestion in the literature that this effect could be explained by differences in funding between 
sectors. Since 1990, funding to schools in both sectors has been based on formula funding (largely determined 
by pupil numbers).  However, some grammar schools solicit voluntary contributions from parents. Also, they 
have more autonomy over a larger proportion of their budget than is the case for other secondary schools. 
13 In 1993/94, the transfer tests were changed from a verbal reasoning to a curriculum orientated format. This 
affects cohorts born from 1983 onwards. 
  7 
same framework, in practice, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in the curricula actually 
implemented by schools, with pupils in a sample of grammar schools spending more time at 
academic subjects (particularly languages) than their counterparts in a sample of other 
secondary schools (Harland et al., 2002).  
 
The same public examinations are taken in both school types. At the end of compulsory 
education (age 16), students take GCSE examinations (the General Certification of Secondary 
Education). If the student decides to pursue academic education beyond this point, this 
involves studying for A-level exams (which normally requires an extra two years of study). In 
all grammar schools and in many other secondary schools, it is possible to stay on for 2 extra 
years.
14 Although school type is highly correlated with the probability of obtaining A-levels 
(reflecting the selection process as well as any genuine ‘school’ effect), there is no automatic 
relationship between entering grammar school and achieving A-levels or entering other 
secondary school and failing to achieve them. Thus, if we look at a cohort before the reform 
to admissions – 1977 – 84 per cent of those attending grammar school and 8 per cent of those 
attending other secondary schools achieved 1 or more A-level.  
 
With regard to the public examination taken by all pupils at age 16, an important indicator is 
the percentage of pupils who achieve 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C.
15 Candidates taking 
A-levels normally take up to 3 A-levels. For both GCSE and A-levels, examinations are 
externally set and graded. Both examinations are extremely important, with A-levels being an 
essential requirement for university.
16 In the UK, most researchers looking at the returns to 
education prefer to use qualification-based measures of educational attainment rather than 
years of education, given the fact that there are different returns to education for the same 
years of academic and vocational qualifications (Blundell et al. 2005). Compared with leaving 
school at 16 without qualifications, Blundell et al. (2005) find an average return to achieving 
O-levels of about 18 per cent (i.e. the examination predating GCSEs for those aged 16) and an 
average return to achieving A-levels of about 24 per cent.  
 
                                                 
14 It is also possible to study for A-levels in colleges of further education. However, the majority of students in 
Northern Ireland who obtain A-levels do so when at school. 
15 There are also equivalent vocational qualifications, which are included in the ‘GCSE’ measure.  
16 The common examination taken in Northern Ireland and England is also extremely important as students are 
competing to get into the same universities. About 40 percent of Northern Irish entrants to higher education enter 
university in Great Britain. 
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We consider whether reforms to grammar school admissions had any influence on the 
proportion of relevant cohorts achieving 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C and 1 or more A-
levels.
17 We restrict attention to years in which there were no major reforms to A-levels, the 




Reforms to admissions in Northern Ireland 
 
As discussed above, it was a political accident that Northern Ireland did not abolish ‘selective 
schooling’ at the same time as the rest of the UK in the 1960s and 1970s. As a consequence, 
the system of very early tracking (i.e. at age 11) has been maintained in Northern Ireland up 
to the present day, whereas in other respects the education system has remained similar to that 
in other parts of the UK. However, an important reform to grammar school admission has 
been implemented in Northern-Ireland in the late 1980s. This involved a rise in the level of 
quotas applied to grammar school intakes. Following the Education Reform (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1989 (implemented from 1990 and affecting cohorts born from 1979), 
grammar schools were required to accept pupils, on parental request, up to a new (larger) 
admission number determined by the Department of Education and based on physical 
capacity only. This ‘open enrolment’ reform was in the spirit of making the education system 
more amenable to parental choice. Just before that time, there was a qualitative change in 
admissions: the rules changed regarding the assessment of boys and girls (in June 1988 – 
affecting cohorts born from 1978 onwards).    
 
The raising of quotas on grammar school intakes was controversial because of the fear that 
grammar schools would ‘cream-skim’ the highest ability students from other secondary 
schools and that all would suffer as a result. A concern voiced by the Northern Ireland 
Economic Council (1995) was that the reform could undermine the selective system: ‘The 
educational impact of allowing the grammar school sector to expand needs to be questioned. 
                                                 
17 Similar results are obtained for other outcome measures – for example, if we use 2 or more A-levels as the 
outcome measure at age 18 and 5 or more passes at GCSE as the outcome measure at age 16. Results are 
available on request. 
18 Reforms to the A-level system have taken place in 1987/88 (affecting cohorts from 1972 onwards) and in 2000 
(affecting cohorts from 1984 onwards). Reforms to the examination taken at age 16 by all pupils (GCSE – 
formerly O-levels) took place in 1988 (affecting cohorts from 1972 onwards). The Universities and Colleges 
Admission Service (UCAS) provide a detailed account of these reforms; what the examinations consist of and 
procedures for quality assurance.  
http://www.ucas.ac.uk/candq/ukquals/eng/gen.html 
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The fundamental point of such a system is that educating the more academically able is seen 
as being of benefit to both the more and least able. By definition, it would seem that allowing 
students who previously would have entered a secondary environment to attend a grammar 
school must inevitably dilute the perceived value of selective education...’ Our evidence 
allows us to consider what reducing selectivity did to educational credentials in the overall 
population. 
 
Sutherland (1993) provides useful information about the court ruling which affected the 
gender composition of entry to grammar schools. She discusses how girls’ higher relative 
performance in the verbal reasoning tests at age 11 was seen as temporary, analogous to their 
earlier physical maturity. Therefore, the selection tests were processed by gender, such that a 
given proportion of each group obtained each transfer grade. However, this practice became 
harder to defend when girls started out-performing boys in public examinations at age 16 (i.e. 
the gender differential was not so temporary). In June 1988, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission and the parents of four girls who had failed to win grammar school places won a 
case in the High Court against the Department of Education (DENI). After this verdict, the 
practice of treating boys and girls as separate populations in the Transfer tests came to an end. 
As shown by Gallagher and Smith (2000), this change had a pronounced effect on the 




4  The Effect of Reforms on Educational Attainment  
 
 
In this section, we assess the effect of widening access to grammar schools on overall 
educational attainment, by comparing educational outcomes in Northern Ireland and England, 
before and after the reform.  As discussed in the following subsection, the interpretation of the 
shift in exam performance in Northern Ireland vis-à-vis England is that this is the combination 
of three effects: the effect of attending an elite school on the group of pupils who would 
otherwise have entered a non-elite school; the effect of losing more able peers on the group of 
                                                 
19 A change in the transfer test from a verbal reasoning format to a curriculum orientated format occurred in 
1993/94 (affecting cohorts born from 1983 onwards). This change seems to have benefited boys differentially. 
This reform is too recent for us to be able to consider its impact using the available data. 
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students entering non-elite schools after the reform; the effect of having less able peers on the 
group of students who would have entered the elite school even in the absence of the reform. 
  
 
A conceptual framework 
 
Let us denote G a dummy indicating whether a pupil attends a grammar school (G=1) or 
another secondary school (G=0) and C a dummy indicating whether he/she was in a birth 
cohort going through school before the reform (C=0) or after the reform (C=1). 
 
We assume that a pupil attends grammar school if and only if his/her ability u is greater than a 
threshold sc which increases with the selectivity of these schools. Specifically, G=1 for a pupil 
of cohort c if and only if  
u > sc 
 
Given that the reform under consideration has been followed by a decrease in the selectivity 
of grammar schools, we have s1 < s0.  
 
We denote pupils’ educational outcome as y and assume the y depends on u, the type of 
school (grammar or other secondary) and the selectivity of the system as captured by cohort C 
(before or after the reform). Specifically, we assume 
 
y = yGC (u)   (1) 
 
Within this framework, the reform defines three different groups of pupils and three 
potentially different effects. Firstly, there is a group of pupils who attend grammar school 
after the reform, but who would have attended another secondary school had the reform not 
taken place. This group satisfies s1<u<s0, i.e. they were at the margin of attending grammar 
school before the reform. The effect of the reform on these pupils is given by ∆01(u) = y11(u)-
y00(u) and is potentially very important since such pupils are exposed to a radically different 
schooling context than that which they would have faced in the absence of the reform. 
Secondly, there is a group of relatively low ability pupils who attend other secondary schools 
both before and after the reform (they satisfy s1>u) and who are affected by the change in the 
composition of these schools. Because the best pupils who would have gone to other 
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secondary schools in the absence of the reform now go to grammar school, this group may be 
significantly affected. Using our notation, the effect of the reform on this group is ∆00(u) = 
y01(u)-y00(u). It captures the effect of losing one’s best peers. Analogously, there is a group of 
relatively high ability pupils who would have entered grammar school even in the absence of 
the reform (they satisfy s0<u) and who are affected by differences in the ability composition 
of their peers. The effect of the reform on this group is given by ∆11(u) = y11 (u) –y10(u). This 
captures the effect of having a different group of peers, with relatively lower ability, than 
what would have been the case in the absence of the reform. 
 
The issue is to identify aspects of the distribution of the effects ∆00(u), ∆01(u) and ∆11(u) 
across the population of pupils with different ability levels u. This is clearly a complex 
question since a child is never observed in mutually exclusive schooling contexts. To address 
this issue, we assume that the distribution of ability across individuals (where the cumulative 
density function is denoted Fu) does not vary across the set of cohorts under consideration. 
Under this identifying assumption, the average outcome of pupils before the reform can be 
decomposed into three terms:  
 
E(y | C=0) = P00E(y00(u) | u < s1) + P01E(y00(u) | s1<u<s0) + P11E(y10(u) | s0<u) 
 
where P00=Fu(s1) is the proportion attending other secondary schools after the reform whereas 
P01=Fu(s0)-Fu(s1) is the increase in the proportion attending grammar school after the reform. 
P11=1-Fu(s0) is the proportion attending grammar school before the reform. Similarly, the 
average outcome after the reform can be written as follows:  
 
E(y | C=1) = P00E(y01(u)|u<s0)+P01E(y11(u)|s1<u<s0)+P11E(y11(u)|s1<u) 
 
Hence, the variation in pupils’ average outcomes E(y|C=0) – E(y|C=1) is the weighted 
average of three local effects: 
 
∆ = E(y | C=0) – E(y | C=1) = P00E(∆00(u) | u < s1) + P01E(∆01(u) | s1<u<s0)  
+ P11E(∆11(u) | s0<u) 
 
E(∆01(u) | s1<u<s0) is the average effect of the reform on the group of pupils who do not 
attend the same type of school before and after the reform. E(∆00(u) | u < s0) is the average 
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effect of the reform on those who attend another secondary school before and after the reform. 
Such schools may be affected because they have lost the best of their potential intake after the 
reform. Finally, E(∆11(u) | s1<u) is the average effect on the group of students who attend 
grammar school before and after the reform. They may be affected because the composition 
of the grammar school intake has changed due to the relaxation of selectivity. 
 
Up to now, we have assumed that the only difference between cohort 0 and cohort 1 is the 
degree of selectivity of grammar schools. However, if there is an exogenous trend in 
educational outcomes across cohorts, the simple differences approach outlined above does not 
isolate the effect attributable to selectivity. To address this issue, it is necessary to identify a 
group of pupils that is affected by the same exogenous trend, but not by the reform (i.e. there 
is no variation in the ability composition of schools in this group) – for example in two 
regions with the same examination system but where the reform is only experienced in one 
region. Within this framework, let us denote P, a dummy indicating whether the pupil is in the 
region affected by the reform and assume that the educational outcome is given by the 
following generalisation of equation 1 
 
 y = yGCP (u) + θC     (2) 
 
where the parameter  θ captures the exogenous trend in outcomes. Within this framework, the 
simple difference discussed above identifies ∆ + θ in the group affected by the reform and θ in 
the non-affected group. The cross-regional difference-in-differences captures ∆, the pure 





We use administrative data that covers the entire relevant population of England and Northern 
Ireland.  The data were obtained from the Department of Education in both countries. The 
great advantage of the data is that it enables us to observe examination outcomes that are free 
of sampling error by gender, school type and cohort. 
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The data for Northern Ireland consists of school-level data on the number of boys and girls 
entering each year group
20 and (from a separate source), the School Leaver’s Survey. The 
latter covers all school leavers from post-primary schools except those in special or 
independent schools or pupils who transfer to another school. In Northern Ireland only a small 
percentage of pupils attend independent schools (less than 1 per cent) and this has not 
changed over time period of interest to us. The School Leavers Survey is available within 
cells defined by year group, gender and school.
21 Since grade repetition is not a feature of the 
school system in the UK, it is possible to derive birth cohort using information on year group 
(or grade) at a specific time. The data contains information on when students left school, 
qualifications attained and destinations after compulsory education. All the school-level 
information can be merged with information from the school census on school type (e.g. 
whether the school is a grammar school or not). To measure cohort size, we make use of mid-
year estimates from the General Register Office (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency). We use these data to construct relevant variables by cohort for a time period in 
which there was no major reform to public examinations or to the nature of the transfer test. 
 
The data for England are pupil-level information on A-levels, where there is also information 
on year group and gender. The data, which gives comprehensive coverage of the results of all 
students taking A-levels in England, is available from 1993 onwards (enabling us to consider 
outcomes from the 1975 cohort). With regard to GCSEs, we have used school-level 
information from the School Performance Tables that is available from 1992 onwards. The 
birth cohort is easily derived from the year in which GCSE examinations are taken as this 
happens at the same time for all pupils - just before they leave the compulsory phase of 
education at age 16. Hence we can consider cohorts from 1976 onwards. We have pupil-level 
information on GCSEs from 1993 onwards. This enables us to consider outcomes by gender 
for English pupils (from the 1977 cohort onwards).
22 Similarly to our data for Northern 
                                                 
20 We use data on inflows to year 12 rather than year 8 (i.e. the first year of post-primary education) to measure 
entry to grammar school. This allows us to extend the series back by several cohorts (inflows to year 8 can only 
be observed back to the 1977 cohort). Trends in the entry flow to grammar school are almost the same 
irrespective of the year group chosen (i.e. there is little mobility out of the grammar school system for those who 
can enter). This is confirmed by a study of mobility patterns by Gallagher and Smith (2000).   
21 For a shorter period, we also have results available in cells defined by ‘Free School Meal’ status of students (a 
key measure of disadvantage). We use this data when discussing distributional effects of the reforms. 
22 The pupil-level information on GCSEs is more problematic than that for A-levels. For instance, there were 
difficulties in merging the data with school-level files. Hence, we do not remove ‘special schools’ and 
‘independent schools’ from these files.   
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The overall effect of the reforms  
 
Figures 2-4 show the effect of the reforms on grammar school attendance in Northern Ireland. 
In Fig. 2, this is presented as the number of entrants to grammar school. In Fig. 3, the trend in 
the number of entrants is shown alongside the evolution of cohort size. Fig. 4 shows the 
proportion of the cohort attending grammar school. Whether one looks at numbers or 
proportions, there is a clear discontinuity for the first cohort to be affected by the ‘open 
enrolment’ reform in 1988 (i.e. the 1979 cohort). The reform generated a 15 percentage point 
increase in the number of students enabled to attend grammar school, for a time period in 
which cohort size was relatively stable (between 1977 and 1979). Taking the longer time 
series into account (cohorts 1974-82), there are some fluctuations in cohort size. This explains 
why the pre-policy and post-policy trends in grammar school attendance (i.e. 1974-77) and 
(1979-82) are not the same when looking at trends for the number of entrants to grammar 
school (Fig 2) and the probability of attending grammar school (Fig 3). However, the 
discontinuity around the reform period is the same. For example, Fig 3 shows that there was a 
3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of attending grammar school between the 
1978 and 1979 cohorts, whereas this probability was fairly stable immediately before the 
policy (1976-78) and immediately afterwards (1979-81). 
 
Figure 5 shows the trend in the number achieving at least 1 A-level in Northern Ireland for the 
same cohorts. This bears a close resemblance to the trend in the number of entrants to 
grammar school (Fig. 2) over the entire period of interest to us. Again, there is a marked 
discontinuity around the time of the ‘open enrolment’ reform. This reform was followed by a 
12 percentage point increase in the number of persons achieving 1 or more A-level – thus, an 
increase that is almost as large as the increase in grammar school attendance. 
 
In Figures 6 and 7, we show the difference between England and Northern Ireland in the 
probability of achieving at least 1 A-level. The trends are very similar in the pre-policy period 
and in the period immediately post-policy (1979-80 cohorts). The really marked divergence 
between England and Northern Ireland coincides exactly with the timing of the ‘open 
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enrolment’ reform. The probability of achieving 1+ A-level became about 2.4 percentage 
points higher in Northern Ireland. 
 
We can also consider the impact of the reforms on the probability of achieving good 
qualifications in an examination that everyone takes before leaving compulsory education at 
age 16. Figure 8 shows the trend in the number of students achieving 5 or more GCSEs at A*-
C in Northern Ireland for cohorts born between 1974 and 1982. There is stronger trend growth 
in this measure of academic achievement than for A-levels. However, again there is a marked 
discontinuity at exactly the time of the ‘open enrolment’ reform. Between the 1978 and 1979 
cohorts, the number achieving 5+GCSEs at A*-C increased by 17 percentage points. This 
compares to a difference of 8 percentage points in 1976-76, 7 percentage points in 1976-77 
and 2 percentage points in 1977-78. Similarly, the post-reform increases are much smaller: 4 
percentage points in 1979-80 and very little change in 1980-81 or 1981-82.  
 
Figures 9 shows a comparison between Northern Ireland and England in the probability of 
achieving 5 or more GCSEs at A*-C. The pre- and post-reform trends in this measure of 
educational achievement are fairly similar. However, the discontinuity happens at the time of 
the ‘open enrolment’ reform in Northern Ireland and suggests an important impact of the 
reform: there was a 4.6 percentage point increase in this measure of academic achievement 
relative to England. Results are very similar if we consider a lower-level outcome measure.
23 
Given that the examination system is exactly the same in the two countries, the evidence 
points to the reform in Northern Ireland being the causal factor behind this divergence. 
 
It is possible to use these numbers to derive an estimation of the effect of a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of pupils enabled to attend grammar schools on the overall 
probability of success at national examinations. As discussed above, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the number of students attending grammar schools not only affects the 1 percent of 
the population of pupils who are given the opportunity to attend grammar schools, but also the 
99 percent who attend the same schools before and after the relaxation, but whose schooling 
context is nonetheless affected. In such a context, the response to a 1 percent increase in the 
number of pupils admitted to grammar schools is not bound to lie between 0 and 1 percentage 
                                                 
23 The discontinuity is very similar for the percentage of students with (at least) 5 or more passes at GCSE (i.e. 
grades A*-G). In contrast, there is no discontinuity around the reform if we look at the percentage of students 
with no passes at GCSE. 
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point. If the relaxation of selectivity positive affects the schooling contexts of the 99% who do 
not change schools, the response may well be a big increase in the proportion of successful 
pupils, i.e. an increase greater than 1 percentage point. As a matter of fact, the estimate shown 
in Table 1 suggests a strong effect of attending grammar school – the implied elasticity is 0.69 
in the case of A-levels and 1.31 in the case of GCSEs. This can be interpreted as a ‘social 
effect’ because it incorporates the effect of the reforms on all students (whether they were 
affected directly or indirectly by the reform). 
  
 
Effects of the reforms by gender 
 
As discussed above, the reform involving expansion of access to grammar schools (‘open 
enrolment’) was preceded by a reform in the previous year which had implications for the 
gender composition of students attending grammar school. As described above, up until 1988, 
boys and girls were evaluated separately in the entrance exam for grammar schools (‘the 11 
Plus’), such that a given proportion of each cohort entering the examination received each 
transfer grade. From the time of the High Court ruling in 1988, boys and girls were assessed 
together. This had the effect of improving the entrance probability of girls because they 
performed better in the 11 Plus examination at this time (which was based on verbal 
reasoning tests). Interestingly, the reform was not applied at the same time as the reform 
involving the expansion of access to grammar schools, but one year before. This one year gap 
has generated significant upward and downward shifts in the relative proportion of girls 
enabled to attend grammar school across cohorts 1977-1980. We show that these shifts have 
been followed by parallel shifts in girls’ subsequent relative outcomes at age 16 and 18. This 
confirms the considerable effect of grammar school entry on educational outcomes using a 
different source of identification to that used in the preceding section since we are comparing 
two subgroups within Northern Ireland (boys and girls) rather than two different regions   
(Northern Ireland and England).
24 
 
Table 2 shows changes in the probability of going to grammar school and achieving 
educational outcomes (1+ A-level; 5+ GCSEs at A*-C )  for cohorts born between 1977 and 
                                                 
24 The focus on variations in gender differences across cohorts within Northern Ireland enables to identify the 
effect of grammar school attendance without assuming common cohort trends in Northern Ireland and England.  
Analysing changes in these variations across pairs of cohorts (i.e., triple difference) allows to further 
differentiate out potential gender-specific trends. 
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1978 (i.e. ‘gender’ reform); cohorts born between 1978 and 1979 (i.e. ‘open enrolment’ 
reform); and cohorts born between 1979 and 1980 (i.e. post reform). In each of these time 
periods, changes in the probability of achieving these outcomes are shown for girls and boys 
respectively and also the difference between girls and boys (i.e. the difference-in-differences).  
 
The specific effect of the ‘gender’ reform is not quantitatively very important but there is a 
clear impact. Between the 1977 and 1978 cohort, the probability of admission to grammar 
school increased very slightly for girls (+0.2%) but decreased by about 0.7% for boys.
25 
These impacts are reflected in the relative outcomes of examinations taken at age 16 (GCSE) 
and age 18 (A-levels). Comparing changes between boys and girls (i.e. the difference-in-
differences) shows that the relative gain in grammar school attendance for girls (+0.9%) was 
followed by a relative gain in the probability of achieving 5+ GCSEs at A*-C (+1.4%) and in 
the probability of achieving 1+ A-level (+2.4%). Interestingly, this pattern is not only in terms 
of relative outcomes, but is also apparent for absolute outcomes. Thus, there is a reduction in 
the percentage of boys achieving these educational outcomes (at age 16 and 18) which mirrors 
their lower probability of entering grammar school.  
 
Regarding the period of the second reform (i.e. affecting the change in outcomes for cohorts 
born between 1978 and 1979), the increase in admission to grammar schools was strong for 
both boy and girls. The probability of going to grammar school rose by 2.9 and 4.2 percent for 
girls and boys respectively. The larger change for boys enabled them to make up for the 
previous reform to admissions. However, this proved to be only temporary as the relative 
increase for girls returned to almost the same level between the 1979 and 1980 cohorts (i.e. 1 
percentage point) as it had been between the 1977 and 1978 cohorts.  
 
What is of interest is that gender differences in the change in the probability of going to 
grammar school continue to be reflected in the change in the probability of examination 
success. Comparing cohorts 1978-1979, the lower change for girls compared to boys in terms 
of entry to grammar school (-1.4%) is reflected in a lower change in the probability of 
achieving 1 or more A-level (-1.3%) and equal changes with regard to GCSE (whereas 
previously girls’ grades increased faster than boys’). Comparing cohorts born between 1979 
and 1980, the higher relative change in terms of girls’ probability of entry to grammar school 
                                                 
25 In terms of numbers, the change for girls and boys between the 1977 and 1978 cohort was +1% and -3% 
respectively. 
  18 
(+1%) is reflected in the probability of achieving 1 or more A-levels (+2.8%) and the 
probability of achieving 5 or more grades A*-C at GCSE (+1%). Thus, when one analyses 
variation in the educational outcomes of cohorts born between 1977 and 1980, one sees that 
relative changes between boys and girls in the probability of entering grammar school are 
accompanied by shifts in the same direction with regard to educational outcomes. The parallel 
shifts in the relative probability of attending grammar school and achieving high educational 
outcomes (which go down as well as up) could not be explained by a general trend in the 
academic performance by gender. The findings are consistent with the expected effects of the 
reforms. 
 
We now consider our identification strategy which involves comparing girls and boys 
(separately) between England and Northern Ireland. The results of this longer-term analysis 
are shown graphically in Figures 10-16. Figure 10 shows the evolution of cohort size and the 
number entering grammar school for males. Figure 11 shows the proportion of males entering 
grammar school. This illustrates the small effect of the first reform (for the 1978 cohort) and 
the much larger shift following ‘open enrolment’. Figures 12 and 13 show that these changes 
are reflected in examination performance both in A-levels (Figure 12) and GCSE results 
(Figure 13) when one compares males in Northern Ireland to their counter-parts in England. 
There is a relative fall for the 1978 cohort in Northern Ireland and a very strong relative 
increase for the 1979 cohort. Between the 1977 and 1979 cohort, the probability of attending 
grammar school increased by 3.4 percentage points for boys and this led to a 2 percentage 
point increase in their relative achievement in A-levels and a 2.4 percentage point increase in 
their relative achievement for GCSEs. 
 
This analysis is replicated for females in Figures 14 to 17. Figure 14 shows the evolution in 
the number attending grammar school and cohort size. Figure 15 shows the proportion of the 
cohort attending grammar school. Figures 16 and 17 compare girls in Northern Ireland and 
England in terms of the probability of achieving 1 or more A-levels (Figure 16) and 5 or more 
GCSEs at A*-C (Figure 17). The effect of the reform influencing the gender composition of 
grammar school intake are less clear for females than for males – there is a stronger pre-
policy trend. For the relevant cohort (1978), there is only a small upward shift in the 
probability of attending grammar school. However, the effect of the ‘open enrolment’ reform 
is much more evident: there is a marked discontinuity for the 1979 cohort, where the 
probability of attending grammar school increases by just less than 3 percentage points. This 
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is also reflected in outcomes, where marked divergence happens between the 1978 and 1979 
cohort for both outcome variables. The relative increase in the probability achieving 1 or 
more A-level and 5 or more GCSEs (A*-C) increases by about 1.5% and 3.4% respectively.  
 
Thus, whether we compare girls and boys within Northern Ireland or make comparisons by 
gender between Northern Ireland and England, it is clear that grammar school reforms have a 
strong impact on educational outcomes and that the design of the educational system (in this 
case, the mechanism of entry into grammar school) has consequences for gender differences 
in educational outcomes. 
 
 
Effects of the reform by free school meal status 
 
We are able to analyse the effect of the reforms according to whether children are eligible for 
free school meals (FSM), though we have fewer ‘pre-reform’ cohorts in this case.
26 FSM is an 
important measure of socio-economic disadvantage and corresponds to 25% of families 
sending their children to post-primary school in the early-mid 1990s (i.e. the bottom quartile 
of families in terms of income).
27 As in other contexts, students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are less likely to perform well in the entrance test for grammar school. In the 
pre-reform period, only about 14% of such children entered grammar school as compared to 
42% of children from more advantaged backgrounds. Relatively low educational outcomes 
are also observed later on in their schooling career. In the pre-reform period, only 23% of 
FSM children achieved 5 or more GCSEs at A*-C and only 13% achieved 1 or more A-level. 
This compares unfavourably to non-FSM children who had much higher success rates in these 
examinations - 53% and 38% for GCSEs and A-levels respectively. 
 
Thus, both entry into grammar school and educational outcomes in Northern Ireland suggest 
strong inequalities according to social background. In Northern Ireland as elsewhere, the heart 
of the debate about having separate tracks for more able pupils is not so much focused on the 
efficiency of the system but the inequalities that it generates. It is argued that such a selective 
                                                 
26 In this case, the ‘pre-reform’ cohort is 1976 as this is the first cohort for which we observe the FSM status of 
pupils. 
27 Administrative data shows that in 1992/93 (the first year in which this information was collected), the 
percentage of children attending post-primary school who were eligible to receive FSM was 24.2%. By 1995/96, 
it was 25%. Hence the percentage of children eligible to receive FSM appears to be fairly stable around the time 
of interest to us. 
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system is a contributory factor to the observed inequalities in later educational outcomes. 
While students from lower social backgrounds are less successful than others, does it follow 
that the selective system widens pre-existing gaps?  
 
An analysis of the data suggests no evidence that the reform has had a significant impact on 
the relative proportion of FSM pupils within grammar schools. This proportion exhibits some 
fluctuations for available cohorts (between 1976 and 1982). However, just after the reform 
(the 1979 cohort) or at the end of the series (the 1982 cohort), the proportion of grammar 
school entrants who are from a FSM background is the same as it was at the beginning of our 
series (i.e. about 8.4%).  
 
When we compare cohorts born before and after the open enrolment reform, we observe the 
same clear increase in the number of FSM pupils attending grammar school (about +20% 
between 1978 and 1979) as for the number of non-FSM pupils attending grammar schools 
(about +17%). Interestingly, these shifts in grammar school attendance have been followed by 
parallel shifts in educational attainment for both FSM and non-FSM pupils. For example we 
observe a +11% increase in the number non-FSM students with 1+ A-level between the 1978 
and 1979 cohorts and a +13% increase in the number of FSM students with +1 A-level. This 
is shown in Figures 18 and 19.  
 
Regardless of whether we compare cohorts born in 1978 and 1979 or pre-reform cohorts 
(1976-1977) and post-reform cohorts (1979-1982), we obtain an elasticity of the number of 
1+ A-levels to the number of pupils attending grammar school which is as large for non-FSM 
as for FSM pupils (about 0.6).  
 
Thus, grammar school attendance has no less effect on relatively poor pupils as on more 
advantaged pupils. However, the former are much less likely to attend grammar school. 
Hence the barriers that make it difficult for FSM children to enter into grammar schools in the 
first place (e.g. lower test scores at age 11 because of lower parental resources) is an 
important source of inequality of opportunity in this education system. Part of the large 
differential in educational outcomes between these socio-economic groups is directly 
attributed to the lower probability of children from poor family backgrounds entering into 
grammar schools.  
 




Some form of ability tracking is a common phenomenon in OECD countries. In some 
countries, this separation is within school (via grouping practices) whereas others take a more 
stringent approach, educating children in different schools according to ability. In the latter 
context (and perhaps also in the former), it is not only the peer group composition that differs 
between tracks – but the teaching and learning environment and more generally the whole 
ethos and orientation of the schooling experience. Generally, the more academic (or elite) 
track is seen as the route further educational progress (in university) and ultimately to labour 
market success.  
 
Reforms influencing the degree of selectivity in the education system have occurred in many 
countries. The effects of such reforms are hotly disputed: proponents of selection argue that 
tracking is to the benefit of low and high ability groups; whereas advocates of ‘comprehensive 
schooling’ argue that selection discriminates against certain groups in the population 
(especially the economically disadvantaged) and leads to inefficiency because a significant 
group do not achieve their full academic potential.  
 
The overall effects of ‘de-tracking’ reforms are difficult to analyse empirically because they 
often happen at the same time as other educational reforms. In this context, the reform 
examined in this paper is particularly interesting: a reform affecting tracking occurred in 
Northern Ireland whereas in other respects, there was no differential change between England 
and Northern Ireland (which have similar educational systems and the same system of public 
examinations). Specifically, there was a large quantitative change in the number of pupils 
admitted to grammar school. Just before that time, there was a qualitative change to 
admissions which influenced the gender composition of the intake. Using a difference-in-
difference analysis, we show that the net effect of the de-tracking reform was to increase 
examination results at the end of compulsory schooling (i.e. GCSEs, age 16) and ‘high 
school’ (i.e. A-levels, age 18). The improvement in examination performance was comparable 
to the magnitude of the increase in the number of admissions to the more academic track. This 
effect encompasses not only the direct effect of attending grammar school for the marginal 
entrants, but also the indirect effect arising through contextual impacts (i.e. at grammar and 
non-grammar schools).  
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The results are verified when we analyse results separately by gender and also when we 
compare the relative intake of boys and girls to the academic track and their relative academic 
performance both at age 16 and 18. Furthermore, our analyses according to gender and socio-
economic background (indicated by whether the pupil is eligible to receive free school meals) 
show that inequalities in access to the more academic track produces inequalities later on in 
pupils’ educational careers (and therefore into the labour market). 
 
Clearly, this paper cannot be interpreted as evaluating the overall effects of a comprehensive 
or selective/‘tracked’ system of education. However it is an example of where widening 
access to the more ‘academic track’ has generated positive net effects. It illustrates the high 
price individuals pay from being excluded from the ‘academic’ track, even when they are 
someway down the ability distribution within the cohort. Also, this study provides clear 
quasi-experimental evidence that selection into the more academic track really has a causal 
impact – it is not simply an artefact of the selection process.  
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Figure 6: Probability of Achieving 1+ A-level in England and Northern Ireland 
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Grammar School Attendance  NI  +3.5  -- 
 
1+ A-level  NI – England  +2.4  0.69 (2.4/3.5) 
 
%+ GCSEs at A*-C  NI - England  +4.6  1.31 (4.6/3.5) 
 





Table 2: Variation in the Probability of Grammar School Attendance, A-levels and 5+ 




Variation observed between birth cohorts (%) 
 
  
1977 and 78 
 
  
1978 and 1979 
  
1979 and 1980 
 Girls 
 
Boys  Diff. 
(G-B) 
 Girls Boys Diff. 
(G-B) 
 Girls  Boys  Diff. 
(G-B) 
                    
Grammar +0.2  -0.7  +0.9   +2.8  +4.2 -1.4   -0.3  -1.3  +1.0 
                    
A-level +1.1  -1.3 +2.4   +1.6  +2.9 -1.3   +1.5  -1.3 +2.8 
                    
5+ GCSE 
at A*-C 
+1.3 -0.1  +1.4   +5.0  +5.0  0   +0.5  -0.5 +1.0 
                    
 
 